The sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of “men” will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that “women” will interpret only female bodies (idem).
The “coherence” and “continuity” of the “person” are not logical or analytical features of personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility. Inasmuch as “identity” is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality, the very notion of “the person” is called into question by the cultural emergence of those “incoherent” or “discontinuous” gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined (idem).
Aquele a quem falta o falus é aquele que é o falus, aquele que é necessário para a confirmação do próprio falus, por outras palavras aquele que é o falus na sua extensão. A mulher é o falus e não quem o tem. A mulher é o reflexo do poder ilusório da autonomia masculina, ou seja, sem ela esse poder não se confirma.
Let us say that these relations will resolve around a being and a having which, because they refer to a signifier, the phallus, have the contradictory effect of on the one hand lending reality to the subject in that signifier, and on the other making unreal the relations to be signified (Lacan).
The incest taboo presupposes a prior, less articulate taboo on homosexuality. A prohibition against some heterosexual unions assumes a taboo against nonheterosexual unions. Gender is not only an identification with one sex; it also entails that sexual desire be directed toward the other sex. The sexual division of labour is implicated in both aspects of gender – male and female it creates them, and it creates them heterosexual (Butler).